Question Two. Whether any Created Intellect could Naturally See the Existence of Christ’s Body in the Eucharist

376. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.347], it seems that no created intellect could naturally see the body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist.

First because that existence is supernatural and consequently a supernatural truth; therefore it is knowable only supernaturally;     therefore not by any intellect naturally. The proof of this last consequence is that a supernatural makeable can only be made supernaturally by a supernatural cause; therefore , by similarity, a supernatural knowable cannot be known by anyone naturally.

377. Again, the knowledge of faith is simply more eminent than all natural knowledge; but about the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist there is faith or the knowledge of faith (as about other articles), according to the article “holy Catholic Church;”As St. Bonaventure Sent. III d.25 a.1 q.1 ad 3, “The belief that the body of Christ is on the altar is better reduced to the article about the unity of the Church, as is also faith about the other sacraments.” ¹⁷ therefore etc     . The proof of the major is that otherwise there would be no necessity for faith to be simply infused, because, unless that knowledge were simply more eminent than all natural knowledge, nature would be able to attain it.

378. Again, if the intellect could naturally know the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist, the bad angels could know it, because Dionysius Divine Names 4 says that their natural powers remain in them complete; the consequent is false, because the enemies of grace cannot know the sacrament of grace.

379. And this is confirmed by Ambrose On Luke II n.3 “was sent,” because, according to him, the mystery of the Incarnation was hidden from the malign spirit; but that malign spirit would be equally able to perceive the Incarnation as the existence of Christ in the Eucharist, since the former would be naturally knowable for the same reason the latter was.

380. This is also confirmed by Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.86, where he says speaking of this sacrament, “Now this operation of the Spirit, which works supernaturally, which only faith can grasp...;” and a little later, “You ask how the bread becomes the body of Christ? I tell you: the Holy Spirit comes over it and does what is above reason and intellect.”

381. Again, no intellect can naturally know a future contingent; but this thing, namely that the body of Christ is under the Eucharist, is as undetermined as is a future contingent, because it depends purely on the divine will contingently disposed to it;     therefore etc     .

382. On the contrary:

The soul of Christ naturally knows that it is everywhere it is, and consequently knows that it is in the Eucharist; and so it can naturally know the existence with which (by reason of itself and the body) it is there.

383. Again, existence is not more excellently knowable than the existing thing of which it is the existence; but Christ is naturally knowable by a created intellect;     therefore his existence is naturally knowable too. The proof of the first proposition is that no mode of knowing can exceed beyond measure that of which it is the mode.

384. Again, the blessed naturally see the beatific act in another blessed, and yet the blessedness is not less supernatural than the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist; therefore etc     . The major is plain, because although a blessed not see the blessedness of another blessed in the Word, nor in himself nor in any special revelation, yet he can see that another is blessed, just as he can see another’s soul, or an angel or another angel’s essence, because the blessedness of an angel does not exceed his natural intellect more than the soul itself does.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Richard of Middleton

385. Here it is said [Aquinas, Richard] that the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist cannot be naturally known by the intellect of a wayfarer, because it is the object of faith. However it can well be known by the blessed, and that too in the beatific act, because things known obscurely, that is, by a wayfarer, are succeeded in blessedness by clear vision.

386. The same in substance as the first point above [n.385] is said in another way but for a different reason, namely that the natural light does not reach to knowledge of this existence.

387. There is disagreement on the second point [sc. the knowledge of the blessed, n.385], because it is said [Richard] that the blessed are able not only to see this existence in the Word but also in its proper genus. For although this mode of existence exceeds the faculty of the natural light, yet it does not exceed the faculty of the light of glory. And therefore, although no created intellect left to its natural light could see this way of existing, yet the intellect aided by the light of glory will be able to see it. Hence he says [Richard] that the mode of existence of the body of Christ under the sacrament and everything that belongs to faith is seen clearly by any blessed intellect not only in the Word, but also in the vision that is said to be vision in its proper genus.

388. And note that Richard does not prove that vision of this sort in the Word or in its proper genus is in the blessed, but he says “I believe”, and this is his proof.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

1. On the Acceptation of the Terms ‘Intellect’, ‘To see’, ‘Naturally’

389. I reply to the question by first expounding these three terms: ‘intellect’, ‘to see’, ‘naturally’.

390. For a created intellect is either altogether separate from matter, as an angelic intellect, or similar to it in its operation, namely the intellect of the separated soul and the intellect of the soul joined to a blessed body, which are like angels in operation (as I assume here, and it will be proved below [nn.398-400]); or it is a created intellect joined to a corruptible body, which ‘weighs down the soul’ Wisdom 9.15. And this last intellect only understands things that are imaginable or that are displayed in phantasms of what is imaginable, from On the Soul 3.7.431a14-b2.

391. By the term ‘naturally’ is not meant that the intellect can of its own nature know the object, for the intellect is like a blank slate which can know nothing of itself alone, ibid. 3.4.429b30-430a2. But what is meant is that the intellect naturally knows that which it can know with the concurrence of its natural causes, namely the active and passive intellect.

392. Now ‘to see’ brings in intuitive intellection as it is distinguished from abstractive intellection; and, as was said elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 nn.318-323, III d.14 nn.107-118], intuitive intellection is knowledge of a thing as it is in itself present; abstractive intellection can be of a thing as it is displayed in some likeness, which can be of the thing as existing or as non-existing, or as present or non-present.

393. The question, then, is not about ‘understanding naturally’ but about ‘seeing [naturally]’ because, when one is speaking of abstractive understanding or intellection, it is manifest that the intellect can naturally understand the body of Christ. For it is impossible to form or conceive any proposition whose terms are not conceived, but it is possible for our intellect to conceive this proposition ‘the body of Christ is in the Eucharist’, otherwise it could not form it. Therefore our intellect can, in some intellection, understand both this proposition and its terms.

394. And if you ask how Christ’s body or its existence in the Eucharist can be known by us by abstraction, I reply that Augustine teaches, On the Trinity 8.4 n.7, how we have faith about Christ, although, however, we have not seen Christ, namely that we do so (according to Augustine) in certain general intentions or concepts taken from singulars, as he teaches there at large. For it makes no difference to our faith whether we err in certain sensible conditions we have conceived about Christ, since our faith does not per se regard those proper conditions, but it regards an individual man, knowledge of whom can come to be in us from knowledge of any individual man. So too the existence of Christ’s body here could have come to be in us from some other existence, as the existence of something else contained in a container or signified in a sign or covered with a covering.

Now it is about ‘seeing’, that is, about intuitive knowledge of this existence, that the question here is being moved.

2. Solution Consisting of Three Conclusions

a. First Conclusion

396. And let the first conclusion be that our intellect in our state as wayfarers cannot naturally see the body of Christ as existing there in the Eucharist.

397. The proof of this is that an intellect that understands only from things sensible understands from these sensibles in the same way in which the sensibles are present to it; our intellect is of this sort for now, and sensibles are present to it in the same way before Christ’s body is there in the Eucharist as they are present to it afterwards;     therefore etc     . But our intellect does not see Christ’s body intuitively before, because that body is not there before; therefore it does not see it intuitively afterwards either.

b. Second Conclusion

398. The second conclusion is about an intellect not tied to sensible things in its understanding, and it is this: every such intellect, whether angelic or belonging to the separated soul or to a man in bliss, can naturally see the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.

399. The proof is that an intellect disposed to intelligible things as they are intelligible in themselves understands first what is intelligible in itself first and consequently what is in itself a being first, because “as each thing is disposed to being, so is it disposed to truth,” that is, to intelligibility, according to Aristotle Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31. Now such an intellect [sc. one not tied to sensible things in its understanding] has regard to the whole of being, that is, to everything at all in the order of its intelligibility. But substance, in knowability just as in being, is first, prior to any accidental mode of the substance; therefore such an intellect understands substance first, prior to any mode of it, and consequently no mode under substance can prevent such an intellect’s understanding of substance.

400. The argument here is briefly as follows: an accidental mode in a per se object does not prevent knowledge of that object. The presence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist is an accidental mode of the substance of Christ’s body. Therefore, it does not prevent that substance from being known by an intellect whose per se object substance is. But it is the per se object of the abstract intellect that does not depend on sensible things in its understanding.

401. You will say [Aquinas, Richard, nn.385-386] that these points prove that such substance of Christ’s body could be known by such an intellect but not intuitively seen by it, because that existence is supernatural and consequently not proportioned to any created intellect as such intellect naturally knows.

402. First against the conclusion and then against the reason.

403. To the first point in two ways:

First, because an intellect able to know an object intuitively while the object is present can know its absence while it is absent (as is plain from On the Soul 2.10.422a20-22, because we know by vision not only light but also darkness); such an abstract intellect can know the presence of bread when bread is present, because this is not a supernatural object; therefore it can know the bread’s absence when bread is absent. And the reason whereby it can thus know the absence of the substance of the body of bread is reason too whereby it can know the presence of the substance of the body of Christ; for that body in itself is an object proportioned to such intellect in its act of intuiting. Therefore, the accidental mode of the body does not prevent it being an intuitable object for the same intellect.

404. The argument here is briefly as follows, that the whole of created being, as it is an object proportioned to such intellect as to abstractive knowledge, so also as to intuitive knowledge; for intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive knowledge only because of a different presence of the object; anything therefore that can be an object proportioned to the intellect in this presence can be an object proportioned to it also in that presence. If therefore any being can be abstractively known by such an intellect when present to it in one way, can as a result be intuitively known by the same intellect when perfectly present to it in its actual proper existence.

405. Also, against the reason for this response about the supernatural [nn.401-402] I argue as follows: that natural and supernatural do not distinguish the nature of anything in itself but only in relation to the agent (since for this reason is something called supernatural, because it is from a supernatural agent, and natural because from a natural agent); but a relation to different agents does not necessarily prove that something is different in itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity 3.9 nn.16-19; therefore it does not necessarily prove that it is different in idea of being intelligible.

406. This is plain because an imperfect being could be supernatural and something natural could be much more perfect than it, just as any substance is more perfect than any accident, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a10-b2, and yet in a substance that is purely a natural being there can be an accident that is supernatural.

407. This is also plain because the theological virtues (as charity and the like) are in a determinate species of quality, and, according to many [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, Robert Kilwardby], an angel naturally has the principles for knowing all the species of beings; therefore an angel naturally has the principles for knowing these virtues, although they are supernatural beings.

c. Third Conclusion

408. The third conclusion is that a blessed intellect in no way sees through the beatific act the body of Christ in the Eucharist.

409. The proof is that someone blessed is only distinguished from someone not blessed in seeing the beatific object as it is the beatific object, and seeing the things that are included in it as it is such an object. But the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist is not such an object (as is plain) nor is it included in the beatific object (it is plain). For it belongs equally naturally to the beatific object to include the thing of one sacrament in the idea of the seen object as to include the thing of another (just as it belongs equally to the truth of faith to believe the truth of one article as the truth of another). But it in no way belongs to the beatific object to include in the idea of what is displayed the conferring of grace on a child in baptism, or the conferring of grace on the penitent in confession - and these conferrings are equally truly included in these sacraments as the body of Christ is included in the Eucharist. Therefore in no way does the beatific object, as it is such object, include the body of Christ as a thing seen in the Eucharist.

410. I add further to this that much less is it required for beatitude that the blessed see the existence of the body of Christ in its proper genus, because much less is such perfection of vision required for beatitude than the perfection of vision in the Word.

II. To the Initial Arguments

411. As to the first argument [n.376]: if you argue uniformly ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’ such that supernaturality refers to the same thing in antecedent and consequent, I concede the consequence, because supernaturality is referred to the entity in the consequent as in the antecedent; but then it does not follow that ‘therefore it can only be supernaturally known’; for this only follows if ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability.

412. But if you understand in the consequent, when ‘supernatural knowable’ is said, that ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability, I deny the consequence ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’, because in the antecedent the

‘supernatural’ states relation to its cause, from which it can receive being. ButReading ‘autem’ rather than ‘aliud’ at line 921. ¹⁸ although it might only be able to receive being from a supernatural cause, yet it can be knowable naturally, because however much a thing may be supernaturally put into being, yet after it has been put into being it is a certain natural thing, that is, proportioned to a naturally knowing or naturally cognitive power.

413. Hence is plain the response to the adduced proof that ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’, because if ‘supernatural’ in each place determines per se what it is added to, the consequent can be conceded like the antecedent, and then the minor that ‘this existence is a supernatural knowable’ is false. But if ‘supernatural’ does not determine per se what it is added to but something else implied, as ‘[makeable/knowable] being’, the consequence is not valid. For in the antecedent ‘supernatural’ per se determines this being under the idea of makeable and so is repugnant to what is meant by ‘to be made naturally’, while in the consequent ‘spiritual’ does not determine the knowable but the ‘to be made’, and so is not repugnant to it being known naturally.The argument is ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’. So if, first, the latter clause or consequent means ‘a knowable only supernaturally is not a knowable naturally’ (as the former clause or antecedent means ‘a makeable only supernaturally is not a makeable naturally’) then the consequence can be allowed but the minor premise to complete the inference ‘this existence [of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is a supernatural knowable’ is false. For it now means ‘this existence is knowable only supernaturally’ but in fact, despite being made supernaturally, this existence could still be knowable naturally (just as the world was supernaturally made but is naturally knowable to human beings). If, second, the term ‘being’ or ‘thing’ is added to the consequence so that it reads: ‘a supernatural makeable thing is not a natural makeable thing, so a supernatural knowable thing is not a natural knowable thing’, then the consequent is not about knowability but about makeability (as is also the antecedent). For the sense is ‘a knowable thing made supernaturally is not a knowable thing made naturally’, which is true but says nothing about whether what is thus made supernaturally is knowable naturally or not. ¹⁹

414. To the second [n.377] I say that this proposition is false, namely ‘whatever is known by faith exceeds whatever is knowable naturally’ when speaking of what is knowable by abstract intellect. But it is true when speaking of what is knowable naturally by our intellect in our present state as wayfarers; and therefore faith in it [sc. Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is necessary for us but not for the abstract intellect.

415. The reason for this denial is plain enough, because angels were intuitively able naturally to know Christ suffering and dying, just as they were able to know naturally his being alive with human life, but we have knowledge of faith about the death. Now the angels’ intuitive knowledge was much more perfect than our obscure knowledge about the same object. Thus do I speak about the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.

416. As to the third argument about the bad angels [n.378], I say that, if any bad angel be permitted to use his natural cognitive power, he could understand any created intelligible thing, and consequently could understand the thoughts of hearts and the mysteries of grace as soon as they are posited in fact. But, as the Master says in Sent. II d.7 ch.10, angels can do many things of their nature that are not permitted to them; and so the supposition is made that a bad angel is not permitted to see the secrets of the heart. And in this way, and in no other, could he see the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Thus too must one suppose that bad angels are not permitted to see the mysteries of grace.

417. And in this way must the authority of Ambrose be understood about the mystery of the Incarnation [n.379] - not absolutely, such that no bad angel could see or know the integrity of Mary, both in mind and in body, as he can know just as well the touch of finger on finger or any intellect’s natural intellection. But he was not permitted to do so for definite reasons, so that our redemption might not be impeded. “For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory” [I Corinthians 2.8], that is, they would never have procured my redemption by his death.

418. As to the confirmation from Damascene [n.380], I say that he is speaking about us in this present state, although one doctor [William of Ware] says that he is speaking both of angels and of us. But this cannot be true when speaking of the natural power of the angelic intellect (as was proved in the second conclusion of the solution [n.398]), but only of his power as he is permitted; and this about the evil angel.

419. As to the fourth [n.381] I say that a contingent thing as contingent, namely while it is in its cause, cannot be known by a created intellect. But to whatever extent something exists contingently in its cause, yet, after it has been contingently posited in existence, there can be determinate knowledge of it just as it now has determinate being, and that in any intellect that has regard to the whole of being. Therefore, although some intellect not be able to foreknow that the body of Christ will be contained in this host, yet once this has been done in fact, an intellect can very well naturally intuit Christ’s body existing there.

III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Aquinas and Richard

420. To the argument for the opinion.

As to the point about faith [n.385], it has been answered [nn.408-410].

421. As to the proof that then the habit of faith would not be necessary [n.385], I say that it is necessary for us, because our intellect, which gets its understanding from sensible things, can get nothing whereby to assent to such truth; and therefore a habit inclining it to assent is required. But another intellect, which regards the whole of being intuitively (and so this being too), can well have assent about this from the ideas intuitively seen of the terms; and therefore faith is not necessary for it.

422. When it is added that vision succeeds to faith [n.385], I say that this is true of the principal object of faith, which is God three and one, but it is not true of all the other things in respect of which there is faith. Otherwise the blessed ought to see in the Word that grace has been conferred in baptism, in penance, and in confirmation. The blessed would also always see in the Word the Incarnation of the Word, and his nativity and passion etc., which are not necessary (whether to be seen in the Word or in themselves) for someone to be blessed. Nor is it necessary in this way for the truth of the other sacraments or matters of faith to be always seen in the Word in order for some intellect to be simply blessed.